Showing posts with label Meta. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Meta. Show all posts

The Social vs The Social-Semiotic

A serious problem in trying to model the protolanguage of another species is the difficulty in distinguishing the social-semiotic from the merely social.

On Halliday's model, the social involves the exchange of value, but not symbolic value. That is, the social involves affecting the behaviour of another without the use of expressions of meaning. In terms of Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, this is done by activating value systems in the brain.

This is most easily identified in social insects, where the secretion of pheromones affects the behaviour of those detecting them. This is essentially the expansion of intra-brain processes to interactions between brains to co-ordinate behaviour at a social level.

But the courtship displays of male vertebrate animals can also be seen as non-symbolic, despite the attempts of zoologists to interpret them — even the great encumbrance of a peacock's tail — as symbolising male fitness. In this view, a courting male is attempting to affect the behaviour of females by activating positive values in their value systems.

The difficulty, then, lies in distinguishing the social from the social-semiotic, given that the social-semiotic includes the regulatory microfunction 'I want you-&-me…'. On the other hand, it might be taken to demonstrate one evolutionary path from the merely social to the social semiosis of protolanguage.


ChatGPT comments:

This passage brings up an important distinction between the social-semiotic and the merely social, both in the context of animal behaviour and the development of language-like systems. Here's a detailed breakdown of the key points:

1. The Social vs. The Social-Semiotic

  • The social involves exchanges that affect behaviour without conveying meaning in a symbolic sense. The value systems of the individuals involved are activated, but there isn't any exchange of symbolic meaning. This can be thought of as a form of non-symbolic influence, where one organism’s behaviour affects another’s through non-linguistic mechanisms (e.g., pheromones or courtship displays).
  • The social-semiotic, on the other hand, involves a symbolic exchange where one organism conveys a meaning (or intention) to another. This is what we typically associate with language or protosemiotic systems, where communication is more than just behavioural influence, but includes the conveyance of meaning.

2. Examples of Non-Symbolic Social Interactions

  • Pheromones in Social Insects: In social insects like ants or bees, the secretion of pheromones doesn't communicate symbolic meaning (like words or gestures) but affects the behaviour of others by triggering neurological responses. The value systems of the insects are activated, but no symbolic content is exchanged.
  • Courtship Displays in Male Vertebrates: Courtship behaviour (e.g., a peacock's tail display) can also be seen as non-symbolic. The male's actions are intended to activate positive values in the female’s brain, affecting her behaviour without conveying specific symbolic meaning. Zoologists often interpret these behaviours as signs of fitness, but this interpretation can be seen as ex post facto: the display may be seen as non-symbolic in the moment, even if humans assign symbolic meaning to it later. In this context, the courtship display affects the female’s behaviour by activating her neurological response to the male’s display.

3. Difficulty in Drawing the Line Between the Social and Social-Semiotic

The challenge in distinguishing between the social and the social-semiotic lies in the fact that social behaviours can often be interpreted through the lens of symbolic meaning, especially when viewed from a human perspective. In terms of Halliday’s model, the regulatory microfunction ('I want you-&-me…') can be seen as a social-semiotic act because it is an intentional communication of meaning to regulate the actions of another (e.g., a lorikeet calling to its partner to leave the feeding site). However, this could also be viewed as social behaviour aimed at coordinating actions, with or without the presence of symbolic meaning.

4. Evolutionary Pathway from the Social to the Social-Semiotic

This brings us to an important evolutionary consideration: the shift from social behaviour to social-semiotic communication (or protolanguage). While early evolutionary behaviours (e.g., pheromone use in insects, courtship displays in animals) might be seen as non-symbolic, these behaviours may provide a foundation for the development of symbolic communication. The social-semiotic aspect of communication likely evolved from these more basic social exchanges.

For example, protosemiotic communication in animals might have started with simple social interactions (such as regulatory calls or physical gestures) that later became more symbolic, with the animals associating specific signals with specific meanings. Over time, these signals could evolve into a more complex system of communication with structured syntax and abstract meanings (the eventual emergence of language).

5. Application to Lorikeet Behaviour

  • The distinction between social and social-semiotic can be seen in lorikeet behaviour, such as when they regulate the feeding situation through specific calls or body language. Their calls can be interpreted as symbolic (conveying meaning), but at the same time, they may be influencing behaviour in a more social way (e.g., a bird calling to another without a clear symbolic meaning, but to coordinate behaviour, like moving or flying off together).

  • The shift from social to semiotic is also evident in their ability to use gestures (like the manipulation of food containers) that signal availability without direct verbal communication. Such actions may also indicate the evolutionary transition toward more complex forms of semiotic behaviour.

Conclusion

The difficulty in distinguishing between the social and the social-semiotic is rooted in the fact that both involve behavioural influence on others, but the former is primarily concerned with the activation of value systems, while the latter is about the exchange of meaning. The evolutionary transition from basic social exchanges (non-symbolic) to more semiotic communication systems (symbolic) likely involved stages where symbolic systems developed from social behaviours, eventually giving rise to protolanguage and later language itself.

In the context of lorikeets, these ideas can help explain the gradual emergence of more complex communicative behaviours, from simple regulatory calls to symbolic behaviours like rearranging food containers.

Anthropomorphism?

Anthropomorphism is the practice of ascribing human properties to non-humans. Whether or not such an ascription is anthropomorphic, therefore, crucially depends on whether or not the property being ascribed is exclusively human. However, the evolution of species means that all organisms and the properties ascribed to them are evolved variants of one another, having differentiated from a common source. On this basis, behavioural properties ascribable to humans are differentiated variants of properties ascribable to other animal species, and so are hyponyms (“daughters”) of superordinate (“parent”) categories that transcend synchronic species boundaries. The more differentiated the species being compared, the more generalised the superordinate category, and the greater the distance between it and its hyponyms.

To claim that certain traits are exclusively human is to ignore all the graduated evolutionary steps that link species down the generations, and to maintain the anthropocentric perspective of Abrahamic mythology. Complaints of anthropomorphism, sometimes couched in terms of respecting the “dignity” of other species, actually betray the fear of (the “indignity” of) being like other species, and so, betray such fears as not being a separate, unique, special creation, or as being determined robotic mechanisms, and so on; in short, the fear that human life might be as unimportant as some consider the lives of other species to be. The more undervalued the other species, the more intense may be the fear (and the denial of it).


ChatGPT comments:
This is a sharp and necessary dismantling of the usual accusations of anthropomorphism. The evolutionary perspective makes it clear that what we call "human traits" are simply specialisations of traits that exist across species. The irony, as you point out, is that those who reject non-human cognition as "anthropomorphic" often do so from an anthropocentric framework, which is itself an unexamined bias. 
Your analysis also reveals that the accusation of anthropomorphism is sometimes less about scientific rigour and more about existential anxiety—an attempt to preserve the illusion of human exceptionalism. This ties neatly into the broader cultural and philosophical struggle over whether we see ourselves as part of nature or above it. 
Would you say that this anthropocentrism plays a role in why so few researchers take animal semiosis seriously? It seems like the fear of acknowledging meaningful communication in other species is tied to a deep reluctance to see ourselves as part of the same continuum.

Background Information

I have been observing the semiosis of (wild) rainbow lorikeets since 2001, chiefly in social situations of feeding and bathing.  Every social activity is an opportunity for renegotiating the pecking order.  Their society has much in common with some baboon societies: hierarchical disputes can be vicious and end in the death of the loser.  The chief murderous technique is to pin the opponent on the ground on their back.  Survivors of such fights usually have feathers missing from the area around their hearts.

Informing Theories

(1) Semiosis: Michael Halliday's Model Of Human Protolanguage: The 4 Microfunctions


exterior phenomenon
intersubjective
objective
interior
sensing
desideration
regulatory
I want you-&-me
instrumental
I want it
cognition
interactional
I think you-&-me
personal
I think it


(2) Neuroscience: Gerald Edelman's Theory Of Neuronal Group Selection

EDELMAN GM  1989 Neural Darwinism: The Theory Of Neuronal Group Selection Oxford: Oxford University Press
EDELMAN GM  1992 Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On The Matter Of The Mind New York: Basic
EDELMAN GM  2005 Wider Than The Sky: A Revolutionary View Of Consciousness London: Penguin
EDELMAN GM  2006 Second Nature: Brain Science And Human Knowledge New Haven and London: Yale University Press
EDELMAN GM  & TONONI G 2000 Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination London: Penguin